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“People Like Us” in Pursuit of God and Rights: Islamic Feminist Discourse and 







  This paper attempts to critically situate the discourse of Islamic feminism and its 
activist incarnations such as the Malaysian group Sisters in Islam within an analytical 
framework that seeks to look beyond the all-too-common trope of “multiple 
modernities.” The paper examines the conditions of possibility enabling such groups and 
discourses, looking in particular at the modern nation-state, and the imbrications of social 
discourses of rights and religious discourses of individual belief within this state. I argue 
that the repertoires of reasoning called forth by Sisters in Islam partake in the objectifying 
rationalities of the Malaysian state when it comes to religious knowledge, with this 
knowledge now situated as a legitimate object of civic, legal and state intervention.  
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Introduction 
In this paper I want to explore several important aspects of “Islamic feminism,” a 
discursive and increasingly political movement which has attracted much Western 
academic and media consideration in recent years, through a case study of one Islamic 
feminist non-governmental organization – the Malaysian group Sisters in Islam (SIS).  
The growing attention to Islamic feminism has been largely situated, at least post-9/11, 
within a policy context of looking for what is construed as a “moderate Muslim” voice, a 
voice which espouses secular-liberal understandings of key values such as equality, 
pluralism and human rights.
2
  On the part of the Muslim participants of this project is a 
keen desire to show how such values, far from being alien to Islam, are in fact the 
necessary implications of the religion “rightly understood” (see, for example, Sachedina 
2001, Kamali 2002, Esack 1997, and Abou El Fadl 2001, 2002, 2004).
3
  This position is 
far from new, enjoying a genealogy going back to early 19
th
 century Muslim reformers in 
the Middle East or the so-called “Islamic modernists” (see Kurzman 2002 for an 
overview). Scholarly discussions of these reformist trends and their most recent 
incarnations such as Islamic feminism invariably seek to locate such projects within a 
“multiple modernities” paradigm.  They highlight how the struggle of Muslim women for 
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For a recent consideration of the politics surrounding the recuperation of a “moderate” Islamic agenda by 
the US government as a strategy in the “war on terror,” see Mahmood 2006. 
3
As will become clear in this paper, these Islamic intellectuals and activists have a deep normative 
commitment to the Muslim faith and its traditions of reasoning and argument, even as they seek to 
transform these traditions. As such, they should not be considered to be operating within the same 
conceptual space as more famous – and sensationalist – figures such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Irshad Manji, 
who are currently enjoying much government and media accolades in the West (see recent article in the 
New York Times “Muslim Rebel Sisters: At Odds With Islam and Each Other” April 27 2008). 
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their rights from within a religious – rather than an ostensibly more uninteresting, or at 
least less problematic, secular – framework works to “Islamize modernity,” “modernize 
Islam” or more often both at once (see Badran 1995; Burgat 2003; Cooper 1998; Esposito 
1996, 2001; Majed 1998; Moghadam 1993, 2005, 2007).  These analyses rightly focus on 
how such struggles are at heart interpretive and epistemological – they call forth a re-
engagement with the most important texts of the Islamic tradition with an eye toward 
uncovering their “true” meanings, which are then shown to be in agreement with the 
reigning liberal consensus of what constitutes justice, equality or freedom from 
oppression.  
Missing from such analyses, however, is a consideration of how such 
engagements do not merely work to produce new understandings and meanings of what 
Islam “says” (on women’s roles, human rights, gender equality, etc.), but also how the 
repertoires of reasoning called forth by Islamic feminists involve radical 
reconceptualizations of the authoritative production and transmission of religious 
knowledge as well as what constitutes such knowledge in the first instance as new 
conceptions of religious “belief” and texts are formed and articulated.  Islamic feminists 
are participating in fundamentally different regimes and relations of knowledge and 
power than the historical male jurists and exegetes they position themselves against. 
Understanding how this is so helps us to see that when we speak about “Islamizing 
modernity” or “modernizing Islam” it is not a question of taking a pre-given conceptual 
“container” (Islam, modernity) and “filling” it with novel content (-izing it), but rather of 
constituting new relations to texts and their contexts, and new normative imaginings of 
what these relations should consist of.  In this paper, then, I want to depart from 
conventional modes of inquiry into Islamic feminism by thinking about not only what 
such feminists reason within an Islamic paradigm (the substantive content), but 
furthermore how they reason, towards what ends, under what conditions, and with what 
implications.    
Talal Asad’s (1986) highly-influential conceptualization of Islam as a “discursive 
tradition” is key to this aim.  It invites us to see how ideas of authority and authoritative 
knowledge are historically and culturally constituted in the interactive space between 
people, texts and practice that determines what is, or should be, “Islamic.”  At the heart of 
this idea of a discursive tradition is an anthropological interest not so much in a set of 
paradigmatic concepts continuous throughout Islamic history, but rather an interest in the 
traditions of reasoning and argumentation that are deployed around often hotly contested 
concepts.  The Islamic discursive tradition is therefore not an unchanging or unitary 
formation, but admits of diversity, debate and difference.  
Nevertheless, for Asad the authority of a tradition rests in a degree of continuity 
that is not always open to the possibility of freely choosing certain elements and rejecting 
others out of hand – it is always located within certain “conditions of possibility” that 
discursively define what counts as “Islamic” and what positively cannot, at least from the 
point of view of power-laden orthodoxies.  Charles Hirschkind (1995) summarizes 
Asad’s argument thus: “Study of a discursive tradition…directs our attention to the 
coherence and continuity of a set of discourses, so as to map the transformations which 
they undergo, including those brought about under the pressure of more powerful 
traditions.”  He continues: In the case of Islam, as the above discussion suggests, the 
possibility of such continuity is underwritten by the divine status of the foundational text. 
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Contrary to what is frequently asserted, this historical perspective does not imply that 
each generation is an exact replica of its predecessors, only that they resemble each other 
in those aspects deemed essential by reason-guided interpreters of the textual tradition. 
More importantly, we can now see that it is imperative for a religious thinker working 
within such a tradition to pose the possibility of God or the divine – even as a necessary 
act of faith – in order to set the horizon within which reasoning may occur. 
The interpretive value of such an understanding hinges, however, upon a 
recognition of the ever-present contingency of this discursive tradition, as new 
authoritative spokespersons are constituted, new “founding texts” introduced (or at least 
old founding texts re-imagined) into the canon, and new orthodoxies emerge through 
changing relations of power.
4
  While Asad (1993:236,f.60) acknowledges that there is not 
a singular, but several “Islamic traditions,” he insists that “these are related to one another 
formally, through common founding texts and temporally, through diverging 
authoritative interpreters.”  And although in his second book he adopts a more flexible 
position on the boundaries of this discursive tradition (Larkin 2008), writing that 
“belonging to a tradition does not preclude involvement in vigorous debates over the 
meaning of its formative texts (and even over which texts are formative) and over the 
need for radical reform of the tradition” (2003:195), overlooked here is how interpretive 
debates may be conducted, what modes of reasoning are deployed and what 
epistemological assumptions these modes rest on can be qualitatively different from one 
Islamic actor to another.  At issue with Islamic feminists is not only what the canonical 
texts of Islam are/should be (the Qur’an is kept, but the Prophetic hadiths expunged) and 
the authoritativeness of its (male) interpreters whose commentaries, usually considered 
an integral part of the canon, are now dismissed out of hand,
5
 but also what styles of 
argumentation are involved.  The traditional commentaries are rejected not only because 
of their substantive content, but precisely because they fail to adhere to what Islamic 
feminists believe is the correct way to reason and argue within an Islamic horizon (and 
this goes both ways, of course). For Islamic feminists, interpretive methodologies which 
do not adopt a critical literary and historical approach to the text or seek to uncover the 
universal ethical message behind the contingent “historical” event are betraying the 
normative impulses of Islam.  Thus, in many of their citationary practices Islamic 
feminists completely bypass established Islamic sources such as classic legal 
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Also, as Messick (1997:403) argues, “it is clear that the “tradition” was hybridized from the outset. 
Already the product of centuries of accumulated local scholarly development, each local version of this 
“tradition” in the modern era articulated first with specific colonial (western or indigenous Ottoman) ideas 
and institutions and later with the modernizing concepts and innovations of a specific nation-state.” 
5
Islamic feminists do not go as far as some of those calling for a “feminist theology” that rejects completely 
the Old and New Testament in favor of “writing new texts to express our new consciousness” (Ruether 
1983: xii) This follows from Audrey Lorde’s famous proclamation that “the master’s tools won’t destroy 
the master’s house” (1984).  In that essay, Lorde asks: “what does it mean when the tools of a racist 
patriarchy are used to examine the fruits of that same patriarchy?” (1984:110), answering that such a mode 
of critique could never engender “genuine change.” Islamic feminists, on the other hand, are choosing to 
challenge patriarchy on its own home turf – that of religious legitimation – by engaging in alternative 
readings of the canonical texts of Islam, texts which are authoritative references for the male elites as well.  
By situating modern claims of gender equality within a “traditional” Islamic framework, Islamic feminists 
are effectively using the master’s tools (religious authority) to dismantle the master’s house (religiously-
justified oppression).  
  Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 11 #1 November 2009 43 
commentaries or exegeses, in the process discursively redefining what counts as an 
“Islamic tradition” and what should be excised.   
This is a point which is often lost on participants in the Islamic feminist 
movement themselves.  Often, participants in that movement point out that they are 
merely continuing a venerable Islamic tradition of dissent and debate – that the 
differences and diversity evidenced in Islamic history has been glossed over by jurists 
who seek to present it as a monolith of consensus. Self-described “progressive Muslim” 
Farid Esack (2002:137), the author of several works on the “Islamic roots” of pluralism 
and democracy and a consistent supporter of Islamic feminist hermeneutics, argues that 
the historical presence of such jurisprudential and philosophical differences indicates that 
“no matter how committed to tradition a scholar may be, he or she still asks questions 
from that tradition and selects from it on the basis of his or her pre-understanding.” Esack 
here fails to see that the conditions under which “questions” are asked and “selections” 
made are located within an epistemic framework which recognizes the authority of 
certain kinds of knowledge and discounts others.  This does not mean that the knowledge 
produced will not be diverse or divergent, but only that it will be subject to certain 
evaluative criteria that will determine from the outset the parameters of that discourse.  
With Islamic feminism, these parameters are fundamentally reconfigured.  
In his seminal study Recognizing Islam, anthropologist Michael Gilsenan 
(2000:28) submits for our consideration “a vital question that is always below the 
surface” of Muslim societies: “which persons would possess the authority to certify as 
legitimately Islamic a given office, institution, or action, and on what basis would they do 
so?” he asks. As this question indicates, conceptions of the basis of authority for those 
claiming an Islamic referent are never very far from questions pertaining to who is or, 
more to the point, should be the proper agent of such claims. Given that within the 
Islamic discursive tradition authority is “mostly epistemic in nature”
6
 (Hallaq 2001: ix) 
and, relatedly, of a “textual character” (Berkey 2001:70, see also Hefner and Zaman 
2007), it is not surprising that the battle of Islamic feminists, their so-called “gender 
jihad,” has been waged in large part in the trenches of religious knowledge, especially 
that of Qur’anic hermeneutics. Indeed, a participant (Khan 2005) in this battle 
characterizes the target of the gender jihad as an “epistemological hijab” in the sense of a 
“barrier” erected between women and “Islamic sources” through their historic exclusion 
from Islamic interpretive communities.  The title of a book by controversial Egyptian 
scholar Gamal el-Banna, who advocates rebuilding Islamic jurisprudence from the 
ground up and is an active participant in Islamic feminist hermeneutics, captures this 
dynamic quite well: “The Muslim Woman Between Qur’anic Liberation and Juristic 
Shackling” (Al-mar’a al-muslima bayn tahrir al-qur’an wa taqyid al-fuqaha).  
Epistemological appropriation is thus a key strategy for inclusivity.   
Thus, while today Islamic feminists take as axiomatic the idea that a “believer’s” 
access to the divine text and its meanings should be un-mediated and immediate, 
traditional exegetes thought about their relations to the canonical texts in radically 
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 The prominent Orientalist Franz Rothensal concluded that, for Muslims, “Islam is knowledge” (1970) 
while writing the Islamic medivalist Jonathan Berkey underlines, in more tempered tones, how “the 
importance of knowledge to the Islamic tradition cannot be overemphasized, since knowledge in effect 
defined the parameters of the tradition itself. In a sense it was knowledge that held together not only the 
faith but the world” (2001:70).   
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different ways.  This change in the “thinkable” is not due to changes in thinking (or at 
least not entirely), but is rather tied to the emergence of the modern nation-state and the 
creation of new interpretive relations and objects of “religious knowledge” by this state.   
Islamic feminist hermeneutics thus operates within a decidedly different episteme than 
the Islamic interpretive tradition such feminists work to transform even as they seek to 
locate themselves in it. This discourse’s differing assumptions about what constitutes 
religious knowledge and who is allowed to partake in its production engenders a 
concomitant textuality that departs in important and radical ways with traditionally 
authoritative genres of formal Islamic thought such as fiqh (jurisprudential) manuals, 
comprehensive Qur’anic commentaries, or biographical histories – the “exegetical” 
works produced by Islamic feminists are in the main academic books meant for a 
specialized scholarly audience (whether Muslim or not) that are evaluated according to 
the secular criteria of social scientific scholarship, as well as newspaper articles, press 
releases and photocopied booklets intended to reach a national audience of citizens (who 
are not always addressed as also “believers”) and, increasingly, a transnational audience 
of human rights activists, non-governmental organizations, development funding 
agencies, think-tanks, international governmental organizations such as the UN and now 
Western policy-makers.  In Messick’s (1993) terms, we have here evidence of a 
“discursive rupture” that cannot be merely analyzed, I argue, as an instance of 
“modernity Islamized” or “Islam modernized” if we are to get at what is at stake in these 
ruptures, the relations of knowledge and power they are enmeshed in, and their 
conditions of possibility.  
Anthropologist Brinkley Messick (1993:5) argues that “the requisite first steps in 
understanding the power implications of a discourse are to know its constructs and 
arguments, to analyze its linkages across domains, and to identify its modes of situating, 
appropriating, and silencing the world of the dominated.”  This is as true of Islamic 
feminism as it is of the sharia-defined “textual polity” he examines in Yemen, for Islamic 
feminism acquires its moral force for some Muslims precisely because it does not situate 
itself as a distanced, third-space critique of, or commentary on, the Islamic discursive 
tradition, but rather as a constitutive (albeit contested by most) player within its 
epistemological field even as the nature of that field is fundamentally reimagined. Islamic 
feminism, whose genesis is put by adherents as no earlier than a mere two decades ago 
(Wadud 2006),
7
 in many ways suffers from a double marginality in its location on the 
fringes of both Islamic discourse as well as feminist discourse. Yet, it provides an 
exceptionally telling illustration of the constitution of new ways of knowing and new 
bases for religious authority in the discursive tradition that is Islam as this paper hopes to 
make clear.  
In the sections that follow, I undertake an examination of both “academic” 
articulations of Islamic feminism by some of its most prominent participants (Wadud 
2006, Barlas 2002, Mir-Hosseini 2003, Ali 2006 and Abou-Bakr 2002) as well as through 
an examination of how such understandings are adapted to activist agendas on the ground 
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 An argument can be made for a much longer historical geneology to Islamic feminism, however. For 
example, we have as early as 1928 Islamic feminist tracts such as the Lebanese Nazira Zayn Al-Din’s The 
Girl and the Shaykhs, where she argues that “women are more worthy of interpreting verses that have to do 
with women’s duties and rights than men, for they are the ones that are directly addressed” (cooke 
2001:xiv).  
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by Sisters in Islam. It is important to note here that the paradigm of Islamic feminism is 
not monolithic, but rather exhibits some important internal variations. However, common 
to all variant articulations is a set of basic premises (e.g. justice means gender equality) 
and a set of common questions (e.g. What does Islam have to say about gender 
equality?), although both premises and questions can be approached in divergent ways. 
SIS is a Malaysian group which began as a “study circle” led by Amina Wadud in the late 
1980s and has subsequently developed into an internationally-funded NGO with 
organized conferences and a vigorous publishing record.  SIS engages in a re-reading of 
the Qur’an and Sunnah with the aim of developing a “feminist fiqh” to replace the 
codified “patriarchal” family law of the Malaysian state, which is derived from Islamic 
law.
8
  As the constitutive and generative link with Wadud demonstrates, it is artificial to 
draw a rigid line between Islamic feminist activism and intellectualism – the women 
involved usually see themselves as “scholar-activists” (see Webb 2000).  Taking SIS as 
an illustrative case, I examine the imbrications between discourses of gender equality as a 
social goal, modern education, law and religion. 
 
I. Feminist Reasoning within a Believing Horizon 
Ijtihad (independent reasoning) is a central issue for Islamic feminists – it 
structures both modes of relating to the canonical texts as well as reframes and redefines 
what it means to be a believer, a Muslim – in fact, their discourse is often translated into 
Arabic as al-islam al-ijtihadi.  Not only is the intermediary role of “traditional” religious 
scholars rejected, but furthermore the personal links of relay structuring this role are 
rendered irrelevant. There is only one “author” of authority, God (Abou El Fadl in 
Wadud 2006: xiii) and between this divine author and any human interlocutors is no one.  
Omaima Abou-Bakr, a key participant in the Islamic feminist movement and a professor 
comparative literature at Cairo University, locates such an interpretive regime within the 
“correct teaching” of religion, writing (2002:64) that “Islam teaches us that the true 
relationship to God is direct with no mediator or guardian (muhaimin) between the reason 
of the believer and the Creator of the universe.”  Asma Barlas, another academic and 
important figure for Islamic feminism, asserts in the postscript of her tafsir 
(interpretation, exegesis) of select Qur’anic passages (in itself a major departure from the 
historically established mode of tafsir of the entire Qur’an)
9
 that A mujtahid is thus, 
                                                 
8
Another regional group with similar aims is the Indonesian Fiqhun Nisah and in Iran there are many 
feminist NGOs and Islamic thinkers who energetically publish feminist re-interperations of certain verses 
of the Qur’an pertaining to women and the family, all the while pushing for modification of personal status 
law to reflect these new interpretations.  Badran (2005) argues that historically the Iranian groups were the 
first to don the label “Isamic feminism.” Such feminist exegetical circles – not to be confused with the 
more common and conventional mosque study circles for women such as those in Egypt profiled by 
Mahmood 2005 – have not caught on in the Arab world.  There was one such group working out of Cairo 
University in the mid-1980s but it kept a very low-profile and eventually disbanded (personal 
communication with Prof. Omaima Abou-Bakr, Cairo University Dept. of Literature).  
9
  This exegetical mode is the favored one among Islamic feminists, with participant Omaima Abou-Bakr, 
in her Arabic-language overview of the movement, highlighting how Islamic feminists are not concerned 
with undertaking a tafsir of the entire Qur’an, but rather only of several problematic verses dealing with 
women.  Historically, there were women who did undertake holistic Qur’anic exegesis – in the 20th century 
we have the Egyptian Aisha Abdelrahman’s two-volume exegesis Al-tafsir al-bayan li al-qur’an al-karim 
(1962-1969), but such women are not considered by Islamic feminists to be within their geneaology since 
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before all else, a believer imbued with a sense of God-consciousness and a believer’s 
right to interpret religion derives not from social sanctions (permission from clergies or 
interpretive communities), but from the depths of our own conviction and from the advice 




There are two important discursive moves being made here by Abu-Bakr and 
Barlas with regards to how religious authority is/should be constituted.  First, there is a 
foregrounding of ijithad as both a normative principle and important instrument of 
struggle against patriarchy, invoking this category while glossing over its contested 
historical trajectory.  The Western academic literature on Islamic law makes much of the 
jurisprudential claim that the gates of ijtihad were closed in the 10
th
 century – after this 
point, jurists were more often than not muqalids (imitators) rather than mujtahids, leading 
to a pervasive “stagnation” of not only intellectual contributions, but Islamic civilization 
more generally.  The broad outlines of this view of Islamic intellectual history is 
generally unchallenged by most Islamic feminists, who see their project as operating in 
contradistinction to this ossified past.  However, critical scholars of Islamic law such as 
Wael Hallaq (1984) have challenged this Orientalist thesis, arguing that while the “gate” 
may have been deemed “closed” in principle, in practice ijtihad continued to be a 
dynamic force shaping jurisprudence. Messick (1993) makes a similar argument, pointing 
to the existence of recognized mujtahid mutlaqs (absolute) such as the Yemini 
Muhammad Ali al-Shawqani as late as the 19
th
 century.   
Thus, despite the stress given to it by Islamic “modernists” following in the vein 
initially articulated most influentially by Abduh and taken up by Islamic feminists, the 
gates of ijtihad were not “re-opened” in the 20
th
 century, and the principle is in itself an 
integral constituent of the Islamic interpretive tradition since its inception. The 
“commentaries on commentaries” were, of course, needed precisely because there existed 
wide interpretive differences, multiple and contested meanings of the canonical texts and 
the inevitable arising of new problems such texts had to be made to speak to. This 
underlines the fact that fiqh was always regarded as human construction, “a necessarily 
flawed attempt to understand and implement [divine] design” (Messick 1993:17), even if 
Islamic feminists sometimes write as if their point on this is unprecedented.   
What is new and different, however, is the delineation of who can claim a right to 
ijtihad and partake in the creation and mediation of new meanings within Islamic 
discursive formations. This marks the second important move by Islamic feminists, their 
definition of who can be a mujtahid. As the quote from Barlas makes clear, the role of 
mujtahid is re-imagined (or “reclaimed” they would put it) by Islamic feminists as one 
which could be filled by any “believer,” thus completely bypassing first, the need for 
“specialized training,” and second, the historic gatekeepers of such training. Mujtahids 
are thus largely self-authorized.
11
  This understanding of religious knowledge and its 
                                                                                                                                                 
they do not make gender a salient category of analysis and they utilize a traditional exegetical 
methodology. 
10
 Questions of the marketing, circulation and use of this tafsir (the paratextual) are also interesting. It is 
published by a US academic printing house  and packaged as a text book for courses on gender studies or 
religion, and is indeed engaged with as such by students.  
11
This is of course a particularly radical extension of the Islamic modernist project articulated by Abduh – 
he was more concerend with arguing that properly-trained ulama can “once again” engage in ijtihad in light 
of modern exigenicies, not in displacing such ulama. 
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production stands in radical opposition to the view of scholarly enterprise embedded in 
the traditional episteme of Islam; for example, the jurist Malik b. Anas, the eponymous 
founder of one of the four still extant madhabs (jurisprudential schools), reportedly said 
that he “did not issue fatwas until seventy individuals swore to me that I was qualified” 
(in Masud et al 1996:20). Such an understanding of the normative processes by which 
legitimate knowledge is produced is reflected in traditional classifications of Qur’anic 
exegesis: exegesis by transmission (bi il-riwaya) was commonly also referred to as 
exegesis by knowledge (tafsir bi il-ilm).  Within this interpretive regime, Muslims 
engaging in tafsir not only are presumed to have mastered the requisite sciences, but also 
draw on a continuous chain of previous work making up the acceptable canon.  This 
mode of tafsir, the most widely accepted, was contrasted with a tafsir bi il-ra’y or 
exegesis by opinion/reason, a marginal mode historically (Esack 2002).  By contrast, 
Islamic feminists such as Barlas (see also Wadud 1999, 2006) recuperate in their project 
this exegetical mode, presenting it as the only truly “Islamic” one.   
Anthropologist Dale Eickelman has written extensively on the “fragmentation of 
religious authority” this mode of knowledge production entails, a mode enabled in the 
first place, he writes, by the “massification” of education and rising literacy rates. He 
argues (1985:168) perceptively that “the carriers of religious knowledge will increasingly 
be anyone who can claim a strong Islamic commitment…”. Furthermore, to be a “carrier” 
of religious knowledge is increasingly framed by Islamic feminists as a question of 
“rights” for “ordinary people” – people “like us to participate in matters of religion – 
people who did not go to that venerable university in Egypt for the study of Islam, al-
Azhar, who cannot speak Arabic, and who are not covered up” argues Zainah Anwar, 
then-executive director of Sisters in Islam (Anwar 2005:240). This re-imagination of the 
problematique of knowledge production as a question of rights – and the dialectics 




II. Of Religion and Rights 
In a widely-cited article Eickelman (1992) argues that as modes of knowledge 
became more focused on questions of “how” and “why” with the institution of modern 
pedagogies on a mass scale, “religious imagination” becomes “objectified” in the sense 
that Islam becomes a distinct system examinable as such.   Eickelman’s point on 
objectification is not so much about a shift from unreflective enactment to reflective 
deliberation, but to different kinds of deliberation and reflection that are tied to modern 
institutions and their disciplinary modes. I would like to examine the “kinds of public 
reasoning” and “reasons for arguing” deployed by Islamic feminists through 
contextualizing the movement within the objectifying trends of modern state education 
and modern state law within Malaysia. 
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This is at odds with the Muslim women preachers Mahmood 2005 discusses in her ethnography.  While 
for some of these women individual interpretive choice is important, the choices themselves are the ones 
arising from earlier juristic rulings and “as such, choice is understood not to be an expression of one’s will 
but something that one exercises in following the prescribed path to becoming a better Muslim” (Mahmood 
2006:85). This is in contradistinction to the Islamic feminist position presented here, where the whole point 
is to contruct new choices sensitive to gender equality, in contradistinction to the juristic tradition.  
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 Sisters in Islam 
While academic articulations of Islamic feminism espouse a politically-engaged 
scholarship intent on promoting gender justice in Muslim countries through showing its 
“Qur’anic roots” (Abou-Bakr 2002; Barlas 2002; Mir-Hosseini 2003; Wadud 2006), what 
is at stake in the modes of public reasoning and reasons for arguing in the Islamic 
feminist project emerges most clearly when examining the discourse of self-identified 
Islamic feminist “civil society” groups. Sisters in Islam is one such group.  A very active 
Malaysian women’s rights NGO, it began as a scriptural study-circle in the 1980s led by 
Amina Wadud (considered by many a “Malaysian public figure” (Ong 1999:361)) when 
she was studying at the Malaysian Islamic University profiled above.  The hermeneutical 
approaches of Islamic modernists such as Fazlur Rahman, Abdullahi An-Naim and Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd have had a formative impact on Wadud’s thought, which has in turn 
influenced the discourse of Sisters in Islam (see Bowen 2003).  There is a dearth of 
academic considerations of this group, despite its high media profile and connections 
with several prominent academics in the United States and England.  An exception to this 
is Aiwha Ong’s (1999) detailed examination of SIS in an article titled “Muslim 
Feminism: Citizenship in the Shelter of Corporatist Islam.”  Ong (1999) insightfully ties 
the discourse of Islamic feminism in Malaysia to the political imperatives of a secular 
state seeking to regulate potentially contestatory Islamic nodes of authority by at once 
supporting groups like SIS – who fragment that authority by presenting an internal 
challenge to it – and by bringing Islamic law under the state’s regulatory ambit (for a 




In addition to maintaining a weekly column on Islamic law and women’s rights in 
Malaysia’s largest circulating daily newspaper Utusan Malaysia and being a regular 
source of authoritative opinion – as representatives of the “progressive Islamic voice” – 
for journalists covering such issues, SIS conducts “study workshops” open to the general 
public at its office in Selangor on topics such as “Demystifying the Fiqh: an Approach 
Towards Understanding How Shariah Law is Constructed,” “Islamic State - Fact or 
Fiction?,” “Playing God: Who Speaks for Islam Today?,” and “Religion, Traditional 
Interpretation & Critical Hermeneutics.”  These talks feature not only Malaysian human 
rights activists and like-minded scholars, but also Muslim academics based in the West, 
American and British-Muslim journalists, and representatives from Western non-
governmental organizations concerned with women’s rights and democratization.  
Members of the SIS board are also themselves invited to speak in the United States and 
Europe, often at the behest of Western academics who are interested in researching and 
promoting Islamic feminism, or more generally “liberal Islam,” as a corrective to what 
they see as the problematic enforcement of shariah-norms (or at least their patriarchal 
interpretation) in Muslim societies, especially in the area of family law.
14
  Indeed, family 
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Ong is rather critical of the brand of feminism espoused by Sisters in Islam, saying that “they have not yet 
articulated women’s most basic rights, that is, their rights over their own bodies....there has been no 
mention of women’s right to sexual autonomy, even the right of women to premarital sex” (1999: 365). For 
a brilliant problematization of the rhetoric behind statements such as this, which present Western norms as 
“natural rights“ desired by all women, see Mahmood 2005. 
14
I attended one such lecture series at New York University (Fall 2006) with SIS’ then-executive director 
Zaineh Anwar, who was invited to speak by Prof. Ziba Mir-Hosseini, a legal anthropologist who has 
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law is an important site of activism for SIS, which provides free legal advice to 
Malaysians “dealing with Shariah & Civil Law problems” and is currently working on 
drafting a “Model Islamic Family Law” that is “based on the framework of equality and 
justice.” A statement on the group’s well-maintained website says that the code would 
draw on four areas: “the Islamic framework, constitutional and national laws, 
international human rights principles and the realities of Muslim women’s lives.” 
Malaysia’s legal system, as with many Muslim countries, draws on shariah principles in 
its “family” or “personal status” law dealing with marriage, divorce, inheritance and 
custody.  In 2005, the state instituted a number of revisions to its family law code (such 
as making the legal approval of a second marriage by an already-married man easier) that 
were met with loud opposition by Sisters in Islam and other liberal civil society groups. 
In addition to these lobbying initiatives aimed at changing the country’s legal 
stipulations, SIS puts out a series of booklets distilling the “correct” interpretation of a 
number of Qur’anic verses held to be the most significant to gender relations and 
women’s status, especially verses on polygamy, divorce, inheritance and the veil.  
Innovating on the traditional fatwa genre, the booklets’ titles take the form of questions – 
“Are Muslim Men Allowed to Beat Their Wives?,” “Are Women & Men Equal Before 
Allah?,” for example – followed by a lengthy answer which cites the relevant Qur’anic 
verses, the incorrect (patriarchal) interpretation of it, and the correct (feminist) one.
15
  As 
Messick has shown in his analysis of “media muftis” in Yemen, Whereas the old 
logocentric textual culture sought the legitimating immediacy of a human presence to 
secure the authoritative transmission of knowledge, the new media intervene in a 
distancing and alienating manner.  Instead of individualizing communications, the new 
fatwas are broadcast messages for a mass audience, the characteristic citizenry of a 
nation-state…the personal matter has become public here (1996:320).   
This dynamic acquires particular saliency for groups like Sisters in Islam, who are of 
course working within a framework informed by the feminist axiom that the “personal is 
the political.”  Within this construction, the modalities and qualities of relations between 
spouses or between such spouses and divine intent become legitimate objects of 
management and control by the state.  This is, in fact, the common assumption 
underwriting all of SIS’ discursive and political work.   A brief discussion of an editorial 
entitled “Dress and Modesty in Islam” published by the group in two newspapers in (one 
of which is the English-language The New Straits Times would perhaps serve to illustrate 
this point more concretely.   
The cause for the editorial is the arrest of three Muslim Miss Malaysia beauty 
pageant contestants by Selangor’s Islamic Affairs Department, an action which sparked 
wide public controversy and led a government minister to call for the formulation of a 
definition of “indecent dressing and behavior” with the intention of implementing it into 
                                                                                                                                                 
written prolifically on feminism and the law, especially in Iran, and is counted by some as an Islamic 
feminst herself.  
15
In their introduction to the edited volume Islamic Legal Interpretation, Masud, Messick and Powers 
(1996:20) highlight how classical works in the adab al-mufti genre generally agree that muftis should defer 
on questions of Qur’anic exegesis to specialists in that area.  Within modern relations of interpretations, 
this specialization is lost, with tafsir increasingly falling within the ambit of legal opinion, as can be seen 
by these SIS booklets.  
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a national law. The editorial writers begin by questioning the very right of 
government/religious authorities to draw up such guidelines, going on to say that if such 
guidelines must be imposed, they “must be carried out only within the widest possible 
consultation (shura) of those who will be affected by these standards…They cannot be 
made in isolation and by an exclusive group of people who believe that no one else has a 
right to talk, discuss, or question matters of religion.” They go on to argue that state 
laws/fatwas (notice how the two are collapsed) that affect “fundamental liberties” must 
be within the purview of Parliament and be consistent with the constitution.  In calling 
upon the principle of “shura,” the Islamic feminist activists are expanding the definitional 
borders of a Qur’anic concept that was historically limited to the religo-political elite 
(Moussalli 2001:162) to subsume the idea of participatory/representative government 
(Hourani 2002 (1962):144)
16
 where legitimacy derives from popular, rather than 
‘ulamatic, consensus. 
 After establishing this as a first principle, the editorial then delves into a lengthy 
exegesis of several Qur’anic verses dealing with modesty and women’s dress, concluding 
in the end that the Qur’an does not prescribe a specific type of dress for Muslims. In 
reaching these conclusions, the writers resort to what we saw is the modernist move of 
differentiating between the historical specificity of the Qur’anic message and its universal 
intent, employing (although not citing) An-Naim’s (1990) distinction between universal 
Meccan surahs and context-bound Medinan ones
17
 as well as Rahman’s “double-
movement” interpretive methodology.
18
  In a very Abduhesque appeal to reason, the 
writers argue that “the message of the Qur’an is not intended to cripple the human 
mind….Are we to be a nation of muqallids (blind followers) which can only lead to 
further stagnation and intellectual paralysis…?” They end the article by warning that 
“those in religious authority must begin to understand that they are operating within a 
democratic, multi-ethnic society whose citizens are not only increasingly better educated, 
but also better informed on Islam and its eternal commitment to justice, equality, freedom 
and virtue.”  
A second editorial, entitled “Differences of Opinions in Islam,” similarly frames 
“the right to speak on Islam” as a fundamental right for citizens of a democratic state, 
while yet another editorial (“NO to JAKIM [Department of Islamic Development in 
Malaysia] Attempt to Silence Writers”) argues that “When Islam in Malaysia is used as a 
                                                 
16
 Such redefinitions were often key to the “Islamic modernist” program as Hourani notes. Another key 
traditional idea which was reinterperated as an Islamic rationale for democracy was ijma (consensus), 
understood by thinkers such as Rashid Rida the “original conception of legislation in Islam“ (Hourani 2002 
[1962]: 235), aligning it with contemporary pariliamentary legislative systems. 
17
 A quote by An-Naim is posted prominently on the welcome page of the organization’s website: "My 
claim is not that we need to secularize the state in order to be modern. My claim is that we need a secular 
state to be better Muslims." This is the central claim of his most recent book, Islam and the Secular State 
(2008).  
18
 Rahman’s “double-movement” approach, heavily-indebted to Muhammed Abduh’s modernist 
understanding of Qur’anic language, is explicitly constructed by Rahman as a suitably modern 
reincarnation of the classical methodology of ijtihad.  According to this approach, “first one must 
understand the import or meaning of a given statement [in the Qur’an] by studying the historical situation 
or problem to which it was the answer” (Rahman 1982:6).  Once this is understood, one has to look at what 
“general moral-social” principle was meant to be fulfilled by the specific Qur’anic injunction. One then 
takes this general principle and attempts to see how it can specifically be applied in the present.   
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source of law and public policy with widespread impact on the lives of the citizens of a 
democratic country, any attempt to limit writing about Islam to only those who 
supposedly have “in-depth knowledge of Islam” is tantamount to rule of a theocratic 
dictatorship.” It is clear that in the discursive Islamic tradition of Islamic feminists, the 
politics of knowledge production are deeply imbricated with the politics of citizenship, 
rights and public space. The next section examines how the modern state’s 
transformation of the shariah into a code of law has contributed to making this type of 
reasoning possible.  
 
Legal Rationalities, Activist Potentialities 
 In the Calligraphic State Messick (1993:59) argues Ottoman reformers, 
influenced by European ideas of “progress” and legal rationality, began to see the shariah 
through an Orientalist lens, perceiving it as cumbersome, obscure and out of tune with the 
contemporary world.  In the first and unprecedented attempt at the codification of the 
shariah, the Ottoman Majalla, “drafters took an important step toward silencing the open-
ended argumentation of shariah jurisprudence. Once central to a vital intellectual culture, 
openness was now considered a drawback” (Messick 1993:55). Codification places 
conscious restriction on the interpretive freedom of jurists and qadis, transforming the 
shariah from an embodied (through memorization and human linkages in transmission) 
social discourse to an abstract set of principles that exists within the neat, parallel lines of 
modern codes (Messick 1993:205).  Epistemologically these codes determine the 
“content” of the shariah as a set of univocal statutes (as opposed to heteroglossic lived 
texts) which could be applied uniformly by the state. 
It is ironic, then, that while Islamic feminism champions interpretive openness as 
the enabling condition for the insertion of women’s voices into the privileged male 
domain of religious authority, they can only do so within the framework of a legal 
epistemology which itself demands a closure alien to Islamic orthodoxy, which allowed 
for a plurality of legal opinions, even if mutually contradictory, to mutually exist.  As 
Asad argues (2003:217), codification helped to create new conditions of possibility 
within Muslim countries, “new institutional and discursive spaces that make different 
kinds of knowledge, action and desire possible.”  This involves new ideas about both 
what the law is and what it can be made to do, in addition to a definition of what 
constitutes “genuine religion” and its “acceptable public face” (Asad 2002).   
The uniform statute of state law is also, of course, what makes the legal activism 
of groups such as SIS possible, allowing them to work through the power of the state to 
institute “real Islam” in contradistinction to what they view as the “corrupted Islam” of 
the traditional ulema.  Indeed, while Islamic feminism has so far succeeded in carving a 
compelling (for other Muslims) space for itself mainly on the level of Qur’anic 
interpretation, its self-proclaimed goal is to change the legislation on family law in 
Muslim countries through articulating a “feminist fiqh” (Abou-Bakr 2002:62,70,202).  It 
does so through collapsing two categories considered distinct in traditional 
understandings of the law – qadi rulings (state, binding) and mufti opinions (individual, 
non-binding) (Masud et al 1996) – as well as rendering distinct two categories normally 
fused in the Islamic discursive tradition – the moral and the legal. For example, in an 
editorial titled “Morality policing by authorities the wrong way to go”(April 4 2008),  SIS 
argues that a rumored proposal to extend the so-called khawlat law prohibiting 
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sexual/intimate contact between unmarried Muslims to non-Muslims contravenes several 
Qur’anic verses which they interpret as upholding non-interference in the “private” realm 
of morality. Far from being merely liberal expressions of individual rights against a 
coercive state as they would have it, the distinctions made by SIS occur in the power-
laden frameworks within which the codification of shariah took place. As Asad 
(2003:231) argues, “it is the power to make a strategic separation between law and 
morality that defines the colonial situation, because it is this separation that enables the 
legal work of educating subjects into a new public morality.”
19
  
This points to how it would be a mistake to view the “new Muslim public sphere” 
as the enabling condition for certain discourses or actions, when in fact it is itself enabled 
by the shifts outlined above.  Crucially, these shifts render possible a multiplicity of 
voices on Islam, not all of which are progressive or feminist.  Eickelman argues that the 
“fragmentation of religious authority” associated with the epistemic shift of 
objectification this paper has been problematizing creates a new Muslim public sphere 
marked by individual and group participation, a plurality of equally authorized voices and 
horizontal relations between producers and consumers of knowledge. He and others see 
“an irreversible trend toward a freer market in religious, political, and social ideas that 
fosters a pluralism often resisted and poorly understood by states and by religious 
authorities” (Eickelman and Andersen 2003:34). The pluralism engendered by this freer 
market, the argument goes, may ultimately function as a key underpinning for the 
emergence of a liberal democratic polity. Lacking in this view, however, is an 
appreciation of the difference between a pluralism of religious voices and authorities, and 
voices and authorities for which pluralism is a key normative value, meaning where 
“different” (and differing) voices are welcomed as a matter of principle. The 
fragmentation of religious authorities, its plurality, does not necessarily entail a pluralism 
of the second kind. 
 Indeed, the feminist “gender jihad” of which the Sisters in Islam editorials are 
symptomatic, is one being fought on a number of fronts: that of the traditional ulama 
which preceded the “freer market,” but, more importantly, that of newer Islamic 
discourses which are enabled by the very same processes enabling Islamic feminism, and 
which share its same epistemological space. Islamic feminists are, of course, aware of 
this, with Zainah Anwar, the executive director of Sisters in Islam, noting that It is ironic 
that many of those who challenge and question the credentials of women’s groups to 
speak on Islam themselves often do not speak Arabic and have not been traditionally 
educated in Islam. Many of those at the vanguard of the Islamic movement calling for the 
establishment of an Islamic state and the imposition of sharia rule are professionals, 
engineers, doctors, professors, and administrators without any formal religious training 
(2005:243).  
Mir-Hosseini goes even further, crediting what she calls the neo-traditionalists for 
crystallizing the epistemic shifts that made a space for Islamic feminist. She argues that 
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Asad’s (2003) sophisticated and complex argument here is against the common assumption that family 
law represented the last strong-hold or bastion of the shariah as the modern state system was instituted in 
Muslim countries.  Instead, he wants to show how the shariah was constructed as the law of personal status 
by the secular logic of the state that defined morality as a private affair, and hence in the domain of 
“religion,” now also seen as a properly “private” matter.  
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“by appealing to the believer’s logic and reasoning, relying on arguments and sources 
outside religion, and imposing their vision of Islamic law through the machinery of a 
modern state, they have inadvertently paved the way for an egalitarian reading of the 
shari’a”(2003:21).  Thus, while Islamic feminists may frame speaking in the public 
sphere on matters of religion as a question of rights, other participants of the same sphere 
would deny them such rights even as they use themselves.  The “objectification” of 
Islam, then, knows no teleology. 
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